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Recent Decisions
ESTATE TAX CREDIT-VALUATION OF LIFE ESTATE-A Life
Estate Forming The Basis Of An Estate Credit Under Section 2013 Of
The Internal Revenue Code Should Be Valued With Reference To
Extrinsic Facts And Circumstances Rather Than By Application Of The
Actuarial Tables Set Out In The Regulations Where The Transferor
And Transferee Have Died In A Common Disaster. Estate of Lion v.
Commissioner, 438 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3036 (U.S. Jul. 13, 1971).
Mr. and Mrs. Lion died simultaneously in an airplane crash. Mr.
Lion's will created a residuary trust in which his wife was entitled to a
life estate and contained a clause stating a presumption of the wife's
survivorship in the event of simultaneous death. The executor of Mrs.
Lion's estate filed an estate tax return claiming a credit under Section
2013 of the Internal Revenue Code' computed on the actuarial value
of the life estate. The Tax Court assumed arguendo that the transfer
had been effected and ruled that the life estate had no value in Mr.
Lion's estate and disallowed the credit.' Held, affirmed: The imminency
of Mrs. Lion's death presented an exceptional circumstance justifying
appraisal of the life estate without reference to the actuarial tables
promulgated in the regulations. A beneficial life estate that vests and
terminates within a matter of minutes is worthless. Estate of Lion v.
Commissioner, 438 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3036 (U.S. Jul. 13, 1971).
Under section 2013 the estate of a decedent is entitled to an estate
tax credit for the estate tax paid on property transferred to the decedent
by a person who died within ten years before, or within two years after
the decedent's death. Basically the credit is equal to the amount of estate
tax paid by the transferor's estate attributable to the property received
by the decedent or a proportion thereof, depending on the number of
years between the death of the transferor and the transferee, but is not
to exceed the amount of tax on the transferee's estate attributable to the
transferred property.! The limitation imposed by section 2013 (c)'
would seem to exclude from the operation of the credit any property
'INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2013.
2Estate of Lion v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 601 (1969).
3Treas. Reg. § 20.2013-1(b) (1958). Treas. Reg. § 20.2013-2 (1958). Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2013-3 (1958).
4 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2013(c).
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that is without value in the estate of the transferee; however, it is well
settled that a life estate qualifies for the credit even though it is not in-
cludible in the estate of the transferee.'
The issue dealt with by the court in Lion concerned the method of
valuation to be used in appraising the life estate bequeathed to Mrs. Lion
by her husband, given the fact of simultaneous death and indulging the
assumption that a transfer had been effected. The regulations have
adopted "fair market value" as the general standard of valuation.! Due
to the problems inherent in applying this concept to the valuation of
limited interests in property, the regulations prescribe that remainders
and life estates be valued with reference to the actuarial tables promul-
gated in the regulations' and proceed on the premise that the sum of
the separate values of the divided interests, determined by the applica-
tion of actuarial tables, will equal the appraised value of the entire
estate. The question in Lion is if, and under what circumstances, a de-
parture from actuarial valuation of limited interests is permitted.
The non-imperative language contained in section 20.2013-4,' which
refers to the sections prescribing actuarial valuation, was interpreted by
the court in Lion as permitting alternate methods of valuation where the
application of the actuarial tables would not comport with "recognized
valuation principles."' It was held that the actuarial tables must defer
to proven facts establishing a lesser life expectancy. This rule is consistent
with a series of decisions affirming non-actuarial valuation of charitable
remainders where facts existing at the time of the testator's demise
establish the life expectancy of the life beneficiary to be considerably less
than that reflected in the actuarial tables." The opposite result was
reached, however, in Estate of Wien v. Commissioner" which involved
the valuation of the decedent's ownership interest in a life insurance
contract on the spouse's life where the decedent and the insured died
in a common disaster. Although the government and counsel for the
estates differed greatly as to the effect of simultaneous death on the
value of the contracts, they agreed that the method of valuation pre-
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2013-1(a) (1958) (no requirement that property forming basis of
credit be identified in gross estate of transferee). Rev. Rul. 59-9, 1959-1 CuM. BULL.
232.
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958).
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (1958); Treas. Reg. S 20.2031-10 (1958).
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2013-4 (1958) (calls for the valuation of remainders and life
estates on basis of "recognized valuation principles.").
'Id.
10 Est. of Denbigh v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 387 (1946) (life beneficiary under annuity
contract, incurably ill with cancer). Est. of Jennings v. Comm'r, 10 T.C. 323 (1948).
Huntington Nat'l Bk. v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 760 (1949) (life tenant invalid at time of
death of testator). Est. of Butler v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 914 (1952) (life tenant dying of
cancer at time of death of testator). Rev. Rul. 66-307, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 429.
"Est. of Wien v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. 287 (1968), rev'd 441 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1971).
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scribed by the regulations should be abandoned in favor of a method
recognizing the simultaneous deaths of the insured and the assured. The
Fifth Circuit, however, giving effect to a Georgia Simultaneous Death
Act"2 creating a presumption of the insured's survivorship, ruled that the
value of the decedent's proprietary interest in the insurance contracts
should be determined on the basis of the interpolated terminal reserve
method" without considering the imminency of the insured's death."
The decision is predicated in part on the imperative language of the
regulations" requiring valuation by application of the interpolated re-
serve method; however, the decision goes further and endorses the
exclusion of extrinsic facts and circumstances from the valuation process.
This conflict as to the office of extrinsic facts and conditions in the
valuation process can best be resolved by an understanding of the pur-
pose which the actuarial method and the interpolated reserve method
are designed to serve.
Neither the actuarial method of valuing interests in property nor the
interpolated reserve method of valuing ownership interests in life insur-
ance policies approximates market value; nevertheless, these methods
have been adopted as a matter of administrative convenience." To do
otherwise and adhere to an administrative procedure permitting the
adduction of conflicting evidence of factors which are relevant to the
valuation process but which are not susceptible to any certitude of proof
would greatly complicate the administrative process and would not
necessarily assure a more accurate result;" however, this argument does
not justify resort to the actuarial method or the interpolated terminal
reserve method when, at the time of the testator's death, the life ex-
pectancy of the insured or the life beneficiary can be unequivocably
proven. The valuation of a remainder or a life estate where the life tenant
is confined in a hospital with terminal cancer 8 or has died in the same
mishap as the testator does not present the valuation problems that
attend the appraisal of a remainder or life estate where the anticipated
duration of the life tenant's life is a matter of speculation or conjecture.
'"GA. CODE ANN. 56-2426 (1970).
"The owner of a life insurance contract on the life of another is deemed to have
certain proprietary rights in contract which are subject to estate taxation should the
assured predecease the insured. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2033. The regulations pro-
vide these rights should be valued at the contract's replacement cost or, in the alterna-
tive, on the basis of the interpolated reserve. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (1958).
"
4 Accord, Old Kent Bank and Trust Co. v. U.S., 292 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1968),
rev'd, 430 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1970); Est. of Chown v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. 140 (1968),
rev'd, 428 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1970).
'"Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8 (1958).
18 2 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 742 (1937). Note, Future Interests in
Estate Taxation, 47 YALE L.J. 1359 (1938).
'"Future Interests, supra note 16, at 1359.
"Est. of Butler v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 914 (1952).
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The more flexible rule in Lion, allowing non-actuarial valuation of a
life interest when the life expectancy incorporated in the actuarial table
is clearly refuted by facts and conditions existing at the time of the
decedent's death and prescribing use of the actuarial tables in default of
better evidence, is compelling and reasonable. This rule does not
jeopardize the expeditious administration of the estate tax system and
restores a semblance of accuracy to the valuation process.
Gary L. Hueter
JURY INSTRUCTION-TAX EXEMPT PERSONAL INJURY AWARD--
Upon Request, The Jury Must' Be Advised of The Tax Exempt Status
of Personal Injury Awards. Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443
F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1971).
A longshoreman sustained personal injuries while loading a ship. The
jury, finding that the injuries were caused by unseaworthiness of the
vessel and failure of the shipowner to provide a safe workplace, awarded
damages in the amount of $270,982.00. The shipowner appealed, as-
serting that the jury had deliberated under the mistaken impression that
the award would be subject to federal income taxation.' Held, affirmed,
prospectively reversed: Upon request, trial courts in the Third Circuit
must instruct the jury that any award will not be subject to federal in-
come taxation and that the jury should not add or subtract taxes in
computing the amount of any award. Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 443 F. 2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1971).
The state and federal courts, as well as the commentators are split on
the question whether a jury should be advised that damages received in
a personal injury action are exempt from federal income taxation
1 Traditionally, any cautionary jury instructions regarding the taxable status of per-
sonal injury awards have been given in the sound discretion of the trial judge. Anderson
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960); contra Wagner v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 7 Ill. App. 2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955); see also Combs v. Chicago
St. P. M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa, 1955).
2 The shipowner also appealed on the ground that the jury failed to adhere to the
court's instructions and that the jury rendered its verdict under the influence of passion
and prejudice purportedly induced by the plaintiff's counsel. Domeracki v. Humble Oil
& Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1247 (3d Cir. 1971).
'See, e.g., approving instruction: 2 Harper & James, THE LAW OF TORTS, 25.12 at
1327-28 (1956); Burns, A Compensation Award for Personal Injury or Wrongful Death
is Tax-Exempt: Should We Tell the Jury?, 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 320 (1965); Feldman,
Personal Injury Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Status Be Ignored?, 7 ARiz. L. REv. 272
(1965); Nordstrom, Income Taxes & Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212
(1958); Note, 26 FORD. L. REV. 98 (1957); Note, 42 GEO. L.J. 149 (1953); Note, 44
KY. L.J. 384 (1956); Note, 50 Ky. L.J. 601 (1962); Note, 32 TEx. L. REV. 108 (1953);
Note, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 636 (1957); Note, 25 U. CIN. L. REv. 385 (1956); Note,
9 VAND. L. REV. 543 (1956); Note, 11 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 66 (1954); opposing instruc-
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Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry." illustrates the position taken by the
majority of cases that it is error to inform the jury that an award will
not be taxable. In Hall, counsel for the defendant advised the jury of
the tax exempt status of the verdict in the course of his closing argument.'
The court noted that in the course of the trial, the trial judge ruled that
evidence of gross earnings before taxes was proper on the issue of earn-
ings capacity.6 Since the jury had been correctly instructed on the
specific elements to be considered in determining the measure of dam-
ages, the court reasoned that any further admonition regarding the inci-
dent of taxation would be extraneous, giving rise to conjecture and
speculation-whether imparted by oral argument or written instruction.7
It was presumed that the jury would follow the instructions on the
measure of damages and would compute damages, considering gross
earnings before taxes rather than net after-tax earnings on the issue of
earnings capacity.8 Although proper computation of the amount of
damages for decreased earnings capacity was provided for in the trial
judge's ruling, that ruling did not touch the statutory determination that
personal injury awards, in toto, are exempt from federal income tax-
ation.'
The minority view is illustrated by Dempsey v. Thompson." The
Supreme Court of Missouri recognized the distinction between a ruling
on the evidentiary consideration of potential tax liability and a cautionary
instruction.11 In Dempsey, the trial court's ruling that defendant's counsel
could not cross examine the plaintiff's actuarial witness as to potential
income tax liability because of the impossibility of computation with
any reasonable accuracy, and its ruling that defendant's counsel could
not argue to the jury that the jury should consider only plaintiff's lost
future earnings after deduction of taxes for which he would have been
tion: Note, 8 ARK. L. REV. 174 (1953); Note, 33 B.U.L. REV. 114 (1953); Note, 42
IowA L. REV. 134 (1956); Note, 35 N. CAR. L. REV. 401 (1957); Note, 21 U. Ctu. L.
REV. 156 (1953).
'Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 11. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
5 Id. at 84.
61d. at 85.
7 Id. at 86.
8 Id. at 85.
Awards received by settlement or verdict in personal injury actions are not taxable
under federal income tax laws. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 104 provides:
(a) In General-Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not
in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical,
etc. expenses for any prior taxable year), gross income does not include
(b) The amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agree-
ment) on account of personal injuries or sickness ....
"
0 Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).
11 Id. at 45.
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liable if not injured, were upheld.'2 The court recognized that a deter-
mination that potential tax liability for future earnings is too conjectural
and speculative for active jury consideration. The court also recognized
that such a determination is independent of a determination that most
jurors do not know of the exemption under section 104 of the I.R.C."
Consequently, a ruling that evidence of potential tax liability for future
earnings is or is not a proper subject for jury consideration in determining
the measure of damages cannot be associated with existence or non-
existence of a probable misconception on the part of the jury as to the
existence of a special federal statute exempting personal injury awards
from taxation in the year when received.
The first argument asserted in favor of the majority position is that
the cautionary instruction is unnecessary-it introduces an extraneous
element into the jury's deliberations. The court in Hall asserted, in effect,
that to use the cautionary instruction is to presume that the jury would
not otherwise follow the court's instructions regarding consideration of
potential tax liability on future earnings but for the cautionary instruc-
tion that personal injury awards are tax exempt.' Courts accepting this
position reason that (1) the jury is given instructions concerning the
factors which may be considered in computing an award of damages;
(2) those instructions do not mention any increase or decrease in the
amount of the award on the basis of income tax considerations; (3)
juries must be presumed to follow the court's instruction; consequently,
there is no need for a cautionary instruction specifically directing the
jury to disregard income tax considerations.
This argument is no longer valid. It ignores the pervasive impact of
federal income taxation. The Third Circuit in Domeracki took judicial
notice of the "tax consciousness" of the American public and character-
ized it as the "positive and persuasive" reason for giving the cautionary
instruction.'" The cautionary instruction is given for the purpose of
eliminating the possibility that the jury might increase the award by an
amount equal to the amount of federal income tax which they probably
assume must be paid.'" The instruction serves to eliminate the jury's
mistaken impression that the plaintiff's award will be includable in his
gross income for purposes of computing his income tax in the year the
award is received."
The second argument advanced in favor of the majority position is
12 Id.
13 Id.
14Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Il. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77, 85 (1955).





that the cautionary instruction introduces extraneous considerations in
addition to being unnecessary per se.
In Hall the court allowed the trial judge's instruction that only evi-
dence of gross in futuro income before taxes is to be considered on the
issue of damages.8 The court then refused to allow any oral argument or
written instruction regarding the award's tax exempt status, stating that
such an instruction would introduce "an extraneous subject, giving rise
to conjecture and speculation."19 Pursuant to its goal of elimination of
extraneous subjects, conjecture and speculation, the trial court correctly
instructed the jury regarding the evidentiary-taxation quagmire. How-
ever, refusal of the cautionary instruction does not serve the same
purpose.
The courts adopting the majority view have failed to observe the
critical distinctions between active jury consideration of those factors
involved in determining the incidence of taxation on an amount of
income which might have been earned in the future, and jury recognition
of a legislative exception of the total amount of the injured person's
award from federal income taxation." Although, in fact, the injured
plaintiff may suffer loss only to the extent of his net or "take-home"
earnings, i.e., gross earnings less taxes, most jurisdictions allow the ad-
mission of the plaintiff's gross earnings as evidence in calculating lost
in futuro earnings as an element of damages." Evidence presented to
the jury regarding lost wages does not reflect the plaintiff's actual loss,
but rather an amount which may be considerably higher, depending upon
the plaintiff's particular tax bracket. Computation of the plaintiff's net
in futuro earnings would entail the introduction of evidence regarding
possible shifting tax rates, changes in the taxpayer's family status,
changes in exemption and deduction provisions, changes in the cost of
living and other variables in addition to evidence of wages which the
plaintiff has actually lost.2 An instruction, such as that given in Hall, to
the effect that the jury should consider only evidence of gross in futuro
income on the issue of lost wages as damages is well founded. Indeed,
without it, the tax computation itself could supercede the basic issues of
liability and damages.
The cautionary instruction, however, must be distinguished from an
18 Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77, 85 (1955).
19 Id. at 86.
'
0See, e.g., Note, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 636, 641 (1957) citing Combs v. Chicago St.
P.M. & 0. Ry. Co., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955); Note, 11 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 66, 74 n.40 (1954); a prime example of the confusion is found in Highshew v.
Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1956); and see also Note, 33 B.U.L. REV.
114 (1953).
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instruction regarding speculative in futuro tax liability. The cautionary
instruction takes effect only upon completion of the jury's determination
of the amount of damages to be awarded pursuant to the trial judge's
instructions regarding the proper measure of damages. The substance of
the cautionary instruction only tangentially affects the determination of
the total amount of damages; that is, in a negative way, insofar as the
instruction serves to obviate the jury's probable mistaken assumption
regarding the present tax incidence on the award. One instruction does
not serve to cure the other, nor does use of the cautionary instruction
serve to indulge a presumption that the jury did not follow the prior
instruction. It should be evident that the instructions are separate,
distinct and mutually exclusive. One instruction deals with speculative
future tax liability on projected earnings; the other deals with a probable
misconception regarding the incidence of taxation on the award in the
year the plaintiff receives it. They serve independent purposes, both
conveying an accurate and understandable statement of law to the jury.
The reasons given for refusal of the instruction in Hall have no basis in
fact or reason. That decision and the so-called majority view should no
longer be followed.
The instant case and Dempsey observe the foregoing distinctions. The
rulings of the trial court in Dempsey regarding gross in futuro earnings
served to keep the evidentiary-taxation quagmire out of the purview of
the jury, and thereby eliminated the conjecture and speculation attendant
to computations of in futuro tax liability on prospective earnings. Al-
though the court reasoned that the prior rulings did not preclude the
granting of the cautionary instruction, it did not state the true basis for
its determination.' The court relied on the same "positive and persuasive"
reasons relied upon in the instant case: tax consciousness of jurors and
their probable misconception that the amount allowed by them would
be reduced by income taxes.'
The Third Circuit's decision in Domeracki is significant because the
court properly observed the distinction between the cautionary instruc-
tion in question and instructions and rulings concerning in futuro tax
liability on in futuro earnings:
Although some courts and writers have confused the evidentiary issue
with the question of a cautionary instruction, we believe that the con-
siderations relating to the former issue have no relevance to the second.
The instruction requested in this case would not require the introduction
of any additional evidence.'
21Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952).
24 Id.
21 Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d Cir. 1971) (em-
phasis added).
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The decision reconciles the split of authority on the question by a well
reasoned analysis of the bases for a grant of a cautionary instruction. It
represents a new view in the Third Circuit, and in federal courts in
general." Other courts should follow the Domeracki analysis and grant
the cautionary instruction.
Gerald Nels Olson
26 See McWheeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1960);
Cunningham v. Bay Drilling Co., 421 F.2d 1398 (5th Cir. 1970); Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Wilkerson, 327 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1964); New York Cent. R.R. v. Delich, 252 F.2d
522 (6th Cir. 1958); and Payne v. B. & 0. R.R., 309 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1962).
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